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Unlike classical forms of deception where the 
deceiver deceives their victims directly, the 
crowdsourcing of cyber deception provides a powerful 
and cost-effective mechanism for deceivers to create 
and spread falsehood from the shadows. But for a mass 
deception campaign to be effective, the crowdworkers 
must rationalize (and willingly accept) their role in the 
deceptive act. What, then, could justify participation in 
a mass-deception campaign? To answer this question, 
we adopt the qualitative vignette approach and utilize 
neutralization theory as our guiding lens. Our results 
point to several neutralization techniques that 
crowdworkers could invoke to convincingly rationalize 
involvement in a cyber deception campaign. 
Importantly, the findings shed new light on a growing 
pessimism about work ethics in cyberspace which may 
lead some ordinary people into joining deception 
campaigns, believing it to be the future of advertising. 
We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of 
these novel insights.  
1. Introduction  
When the news broke that “Samsung has just been 
slapped with a $340K fine for paying people to slam 
HTC in online forums,” [1] many of us probably did not 
pay it enough attention, since the digital space is littered 
with anonymous opportunities to deceive and hurt 
others. But, who would have thought that a corporation 
as big as Samsung would take part in a mass deception 
campaign, orchestrated by a marketing agency and 
executed by ordinary students [1]–[4]? Cyber mass 
deception campaigns such as this (aka, crowdturfing, 
cyber-turfing, and online astroturfing) are by no means 
a rare occurrence. The tactic is gathering widespread use 
in both commerce [5]–[7] as well as in politics [8]–[10] 
to score quick victories. Alarmingly, research has shown 
that online falsehood travels “significantly farther, 
faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth” [11, p. 
1146], and it continues to shape people’s beliefs and 
attitudes toward a given subject even after the false 
content has been debunked [12]. As such, opinions that 
are formed, and decisions that are made based on 
misleading information can have severe ramifications 
on the well-being of individuals, organizations, and 
societies at large [11]–[14]. 
From a cybersecurity standpoint, cyber deception is 
an attack on the accuracy of information circulating 
online [15]–[17]. What makes these disinformation 
attacks an exceptionally grim threat to handle is their 
subtle and unobtrusive nature. Various methods of 
detection have been utilized to detect and curb these 
mass-deception campaigns [18]–[20], but the people 
involved quickly learn how the detection algorithms 
work and adapt their behavior to circumvent future 
detection, creating a constant arms-race [21]. In 
addition, the most glaring problem with this 
countermeasure is that it typically is a late measure in an 
optimal security action plan [22]. Since online 
disinformation spreads quickly and influences deeply, 
by the time it is detected and removed, its goals may 
already have been achieved. Therefore, the security 
efforts have been trying to focus on pre-kinetic events, 
or the stages which temporally occur prior to an attack, 
such as the thought processes that facilitate or dissuade 
potential offenders from participating in cybercrime in 
the first place [23]. 
This article addresses a central question in this 
battle against cyber deception: what rationalizations 
could justify participating in the crowdsourcing of cyber 
deception? To answer this question, we adopt the 
qualitative vignette method and use neutralization 
theory [24]–[27] as our guiding theoretical framework. 
As will be revealed later, the work points our attention 
to five exceptionally convincing techniques deeming 
cyber deception justifiable. Three of these techniques 
are classical and widely known in IS research, namely, 
‘appeal to higher loyalty’, ‘denial of responsibility’, and 
‘denial of injury’. The other two techniques have 
emerged from our analysis of the interview data. We call 
them the ‘appeal to professionalism’, and ‘appeal to 
normative fluidity’. 
2. Background: the evolution of deception  
Deception is not a novel concern, and scholars have 
studied this behavior from various fields, including 





psychology [28], criminology [29], business and 
organization [30], and more recently, information 
systems [31]–[33]. Broadly speaking, deception 
“implies that an agent acts or speaks so as to induce a 
false belief in a target or victim.” [28, p. 133]. More 
strictly, it involves an interaction between two parties: a 
deceiver and their target. The deceiver’s aim is to 
“manipulate the environment of the other party, the 
target, so as to intentionally foster an incorrect cognitive 
representation of the target’s situation and instigate a 
desired action, one the target would be unlikely to take 
without the manipulation” [32, p. 95].  
Two generations of deception are worth noting: 
classical (or traditional) deception, and Internet (or 
electronically mediated) deception. Classical deception 
is traced back to the art of conjuring, where “the 
successful conjurer guides the thoughts of the onlookers 
to the desired conclusions” [28, p. 137]. A popular 
example of classical deception is when a deceiver 
convinces their target-victim that they are buying a 
genuine-brand watch when in reality it is a counterfeit. 
Whereas this classical form of deception may involve 
physical interaction between the deceiver and the target 
(e.g., a street encounter); Internet deception, especially 
in its early days, utilizes the Internet as a communication 
medium between the deceiver and their victim. For 
example, instead of deceiving the victim into buying a 
counterfeit watch in a street exchange, the Internet made 
it possible for the deceiver to deceive Internet shoppers 
(e.g., in an email exchange or on an e-commerce site) 
without the need to meet them face-to-face [31], [32].  
What is common to both generations (classical and 
Internet-mediated deception) is that there is always one 
degree of separation between the deceiver and their 
victim. In other words, the deceiver, be it a business or 
an individual, is always in direct interaction with the 
target-victim, whether in a street or in an email. Today, 
we are witnessing a new generation of (cyber) deception 
where the deceiver is utilizing recent developments in 
crowd-based technologies and business models, such as 
crowdsourcing and gig economy [34]–[39], to add two 
or more degrees of separation between them (the 
deceiver) and their targeted victims. Indeed, with the 
abundance of available solutions, deceivers may be 
asking themselves: why do the work yourself if you can 
hire the masses to do it for you?  
Recent high-profile mass deception examples in 
both business [5]–[7] and politics [8]–[10] attest to the 
growing trend of deceivers utilizing crowdsourcing to 
spread misleading information and induce false beliefs 
among their targets/victims [28]. Following the 
conventional crowdsourcing platform model [34]–[37], 
[40], the orchestration of work requires concerted 
efforts among three partners: (a) requesters, those who 
order and pay for the gigs or tasks; (b) workers, those 
who execute the task for a fee; and (c) the 
crowdsourcing organizers, those who organize and 
orchestrate the exchange between requesters and 
workers [41]. In the same line, crowdturfing is a typical 
two-sided market [40], [42]–[44], where disinformation 
gigs are delegated to a general working populace who 
willingly participate in the process, receiving incentives 
in return [41], [45]. Unlike typical services traded on 
crowdsourcing platforms (such as clickwork, logo 
designs, image labeling, etc. [34]–[37]), the transacted 
service here is ‘deception’ primarily by means of false 
information. This includes fake reviews, misleading 
comments, and false impressions, to name a few [5], [7], 
[41], [46], [47]. Leveraging crowdsourcing on digital 
platforms enables deceivers to achieve a massive scale 
and rapid spread of disinformation, which sets it apart 
from traditional, less sophisticated forms of deception.  
The disinformation acts done by the crowdworkers 
are generally anything a normal user is capable of, as the 
worker's intent is to pretend to be a typical user. These 
include, for example, posting, commenting, 
liking/upvoting, writing reviews and sharing links. Of 
course, the crowdsourcing of deception is only one of 
various forms of deception that exist in cyberspace. For 
instance, there is considerable research on deceptive 
practices that utilize automated bots, or accounts that 
appear to belong to humans when in reality they are 
operated fully or partially by a program [48]–[50]. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these various forms 
of cyber deception, the main focus of this article is on 
the justifiability of deceptive practices by the human 
worker. 
In sum, most current work on cyber deception has 
characterized the network of actors who participate into 
the business, as well as developed technical methods of 
detecting the attacks after they have been executed (i.e., 
after the fact). However, the pre-kinetic events of the 
phenomenon have received less attention, and thus 
approaches that focus on the motivational and 
behavioral aspects of the problem have been called for 
[51]. In addition, prior work has examined the types of 
services offered by black-hat marketplaces [41], [52] 
but thus far, little attention has been given to how the 
crowd workers justify their involvement in taking part 
in deceptive work on behalf of the deceiver.  
3. Neutralization theory 
Neutralization theory [24]–[27] is one of the most 
popular and influential explanations of deviant 
behavior. The original work on neutralization theory 
dates back to the 1950s: Sykes and Matza challenged the 
dominant perspective at that time, which assumed that 
delinquents adopt a completely inverted moral code that 
runs contrary to conventional morality [53]. Sykes and 
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Matza [24] suggested that this perspective (often called 
the sub-culture view) was rather simplistic, especially in 
that it rested upon the strong assumption that there is a 
clear demarcation between the two worlds: that of the 
law-abiding citizen, and that of the delinquent [27]. If 
that was indeed the case, Sykes and Matza argued, then 
there would be no reason to believe that crime brings 
shame or guilt to those who commit it. However, “many 
delinquents do experience a sense of guilt or shame, and 
… [these feelings should not] be dismissed as a purely 
manipulative gesture to appease those in authority” [24], 
pp. 664-5, emphasis original].  
Sykes and Matza [24] proposed that many 
delinquents may have devised various techniques that 
enabled them to drift between the two worlds: that of 
crime and that of social order [27]. Their work, later to 
be known as neutralization theory, provides an 
explanation for how early-stage criminals cope with the 
dilemma of committing crime yet respecting social 
order. Specifically, neutralization theory assumes that 
delinquents are “partially committed to the dominant 
social order” [24, p. 666], and that this partial 
commitment is what drives them to utilize different 
neutralization techniques that dull the feeling of shame 
that comes with engagement in anti-social, deviant 
behavior. As Maruna and Copes [25] point out, 
neutralizations’ main purpose is to free “the offenders 
from the moral binds that prevent offending” [p. 298].  
Sykes and Matza’s [24] work resulted in the 
identification of five popular guilt-neutralizing 
mechanisms, which they called techniques of 
neutralization. These are ‘denial of responsibility’, 
‘denial of injury’, ‘denial of victim’, ‘condemnation of 
condemners’, and ‘appeal to higher loyalties’. More 
details on these techniques will be provided in the 
findings section. Each of these techniques provides a 
counterargument to justify the temporary deviant 
behavior from the offender’s point of view. Later 
research in criminology has unearthed further 
techniques that offenders could deploy to neutralize 
their anti-social behavior in different contexts. These 
include the metaphor of the ledger [54] defense of the 
necessity [55], and claim of entitlement [56]. For a more 
complete list of techniques see Maruna and Cope’s [25] 
work in criminology and Willison et al.’s [23] work in 
information systems.  
In the IS field, neutralization theory has been used 
to explain deviant behavior in two main research 
themes. The first theme covers workplace deviance 
committed by employees. Two distinct topics have 
dominated this area of research: one explores the 
justifiability of crimes committed by employees, such as 
hacking and stealing [57], [58]; and the other explores 
non-criminal violations of organizational policy, such as 
cyberloafing [59], [60] and shadow IT use [61], [62]. 
The second research theme explores the justifiability of 
software and music piracy, [63]–[65] covering deviant 
behavior outside organizational context. 
 To our best knowledge, the neutralization theory 
lens has never been used to explore the justifiability of 
mass deception crowdwork, the focus of this article.  
4. Research approach  
The crowdsourcing of disinformation is a secretive 
mode of operation in cyberspace, and therefore it is a 
challenging feat to identify, let alone invite, participants 
who are willing to share their experiences. Things get 
more complicated when the research question delves 
into self-reflection on a sensitive subject such as the 
justifiability of an unethical behavior. When first-hand 
experiences are not readily available, the vignette 
research approach provides an optimal alternative for 
empirical data collection [66]–[69].  
In principle, the vignette is a “technique used in 
structured and depth interviews as well as focus groups, 
providing sketches of fictional (or fictionalized) 
scenarios. The respondent is then invited to imagine, 
drawing on his or her own experience, how the central 
character in the scenario will behave” [68, pp. 175-176]. 
This approach allows for a less confrontational 
discussion on sensitive topics, such as crowdturfing, 
without pressuring the interviewees to answer on 
unethical matters on a personal level. Vignette research 
designs are suitable to both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches [66]–[69]. In the IS field, however, vignettes 
have been mostly used in quantitative studies [26], [70], 
[71], where research participants are presented with one 
or more scenarios and then asked to respond to a range 
of measurements using predetermined scales. By 
contrast, in the qualitative vignette method both the 
interviewer and the interviewee engage in a 
conversation about a topic of interest, typically reflected 
by the fictionalized scenario, in an attempt to access the 
participants’ own ‘stock of knowledge’ [68] and co-
construct an explanation that makes sense of the 
scenario at hand.  
In the current study, the vignette is formulated to 
resemble as much as possible the experience of an 
individual crowdworker taking part in the Samsung vs. 
HTC mass deception campaign [1]–[4]. In this 
campaign, Samsung's appointed agent company hired 
ordinary university students to do their bidding, hence 
we believe that conducting the research among of 
students suits the purpose of this study. The vignette 
itself is divided into four main parts. The first part gives 
a brief background on the narrative’s protagonist, a 
student called Paul, and some of his interests. The 
second part introduces a digital marketing campaign 
associated with the release of a new mobile phone, for 
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which Paul is invited to participate for a decent amount 
of money. The third part describes some of the gigs that 
Paul is required to complete before he can receive his 
paycheck. These gigs include, among other things, 
fabricating positive comments and reviews about the 
new phone and its manufacturer (similar to Samsung), 
as well as spreading negative comments about a leading 
competitor (similar to HTC). The fourth part depicts a 
confrontation between Paul and one of his dear friends 
who did not approve of his actions, which concludes 
with Paul’s admission of guilt and attempting to justify 
his participation in the campaign.  
This vignette was presented to the interviewees as 
reading material right before the interview, where they 
were asked to imagine themselves as this dear friend and 
reflect on Paul’s actions and gauge the plausibility of the 
different possible ways in which his behavior could be 
justified. We made sure that the vignette reflected Paul’s 
admission of guilt as a result of his deceptive behavior, 
since, according to neutralization theory, without 
feelings of guilt or shame, there would be nothing to 
neutralize [24], [53], [72]. 
Twenty interviewees agreed to participate in this 
study, all of whom are university students (similar to the 
real campaign). The interviewees were first asked for 
their initial impressions and the excuses Paul would give 
to justify his participation in the campaign. After this 
unprompted discussion, the interviewees would be 
asked to reflect on the plausibility of various 
justifications based on the five classical neutralization 
techniques. Analysis of the data utilized both theory-
driven and data-driven coding. Whereas neutralization 
theory sensitized us to the five classical techniques, 
data-driven codes allowed us to capture the potentially 
emerging ones. Based on their answers, we were able to 
gain rare insights into the justifications that could enable 
ordinary people to engage in unethical (and potentially 
illegal) behavior. 
5. Findings 
In this section, we report our findings on the most 
prevalent rationalizations deeming participation in 
cyber deception justifiable. We begin by presenting our 
findings regarding the acceptability of the five classical 
techniques. Whereas the appeal to higher loyalty, denial 
of responsibility, and denial of injury were found to be 
acceptable justifications, the denial of the victim and 
condemnation of the condemners techniques were 
generally unacceptable. Then, we present our findings 
regarding the emergence of two novel techniques that 
emerged from the in-depth interview discussions: 
namely, appeal to professionalism and appeal to 
normative fluidity.  
5.1. Appeal to higher loyalties 
The analysis reveals that rationalizations alluding to 
higher loyalties are the most acceptable form of 
justification among our interviewees. According to 
neutralization theory, the appeal to higher loyalties 
technique allows the offender to commit norm-breaking 
by claiming loyalty to a person, such as family and 
friends [24], or to a thing [73], such as a value or a belief 
[74]. In the vignette, this rationalization is reflected by 
Paul claiming loyalty to “a friend”, to “money”, and to 
“having fun”.  
Interestingly, the interviews suggest that the appeal 
to ‘a thing’ is more acceptable as an excuse for online 
deception vis-à-vis the appeal to ‘a person’. Appeal to 
money and making profit, for example, appears to be a 
widely accepted justification for participating in the 
campaign. For instance, one interviewee said, “I think 
he's after the money and this seemed like a smart way to 
do it.” [Interviewee_M10]; while another rationalized: 
“If Paul was starving, or whatever, and needed the 
money, I'd be okay with it.” [Interviewee_M2]. By 
contrast, justifying Paul’s role in the campaign as a favor 
to his friend, although was generally accepted, received 
some dispute from several interviewees. For instance, 
some disputed by saying “I don't think a friend's request 
warrants such involvement” [Interviewee_M4], and “If 
a friend asks you to do a crime, you should stop that 
friend” [Interviewee_F4].  
In IS research, the appeal to higher loyalties is 
among the most applied neutralization technique to 
justify norm-breaking in both organizational [26], [75], 
[76] and non-organizational contexts [63], [64], [77]. 
For instance, in the context of software piracy, this 
technique is often used to argue that creating 
unauthorized copies of software is justifiable when it is 
done to help a friend who cannot afford to purchase the 
software [65]. 
5.2. Denial of responsibility  
The findings suggest that rationalizations alluding 
to denial of responsibility are highly acceptable among 
the study participants. The denial of responsibility 
technique is used to liberate oneself from the sense of 
accountability with respect to the situation at hand, 
arguing for example, that the crime is “due to forces 
outside of the individual and beyond his control” [24, p. 
667]. In the vignette, this rationalization is reflected by 
Paul dodging accountability for participating in the 
campaign by making arguments like “I didn’t really 
know this wasn’t allowed”.  
Interestingly, most interviewees considered this 
technique to be a convincing justification, since Paul 
could plausibly argue that he was not aware of any rules 
that prohibit posting false content on his own social 
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media account. Some of the justifications supporting 
Paul’s denial of responsibility diverted the attention 
from Paul’s actions to the less-than-optimal regulations 
governing the operations of social media platforms. For 
instance, some implied that it is not Paul’s fault when 
“there's probably a loophole somewhere that allows 
these campaigns to exist.” [Interviewee_M4]. This is 
not the full picture, however, since some interviewees 
were not satisfied with this being a good rationalization 
to join online deceptive campaigns. To them, Paul was 
only making up an excuse to justify being caught, and 
hence they did not accept this as justification. In their 
view, Paul should know better.  
In IS research, the denial of responsibility is 
considered one of the most effective neutralization 
techniques used to justify violations in both workplace 
[26], [78] and non-workplace contexts [64], [77]. For 
instance, in the context of organizational Internet abuse, 
employees have used this technique to argue that using 
Internet access provided by the organization for 
personal purposes is justifiable if they are not sure 
whether there is Internet use policy in the organization, 
or if they do not understand it properly [78].     
5.3. Denial of injury 
Our findings suggest that rationalizations alluding 
to the denial of injury are highly acceptable. The denial 
of injury technique provides an argument that 
diminishes the impact of the act on the victim, arguing 
for example that act “does not really cause any great 
harm” [24, p. 668]. In the vignette, this rationalization is 
reflected with Paul attempting to minimize the impact 
of his deceptive actions by making statements like “it’s 
not a big deal”, “It’s digital environment, so it doesn’t 
really matter” and “nobody that could be hurt was 
hurt”.  
Surprisingly, several interviewees considered 
Paul’s actions as minor if not close to victimless. One 
interviewee questioned the impact of Paul’s role in the 
campaign and exclaimed: “what's one guy anyway?” 
[Interviewee_M5]. Others justified Paul’s actions by 
claiming that content social media should not be a 
source of information anyway: “nobody should be 
believing social media anyway at this point.” 
[Interviewee_F1]. 
In contrast, some interviews challenged Paul’s 
attempt at denying injury by highlighting that an adult 
person, such as Paul, should recognize that his virtual 
behavior has physical, non-virtual ramifications. They 
argued that Paul should be cognizant that people in his 
social network who trusted him would likely make real-
life decisions based on his views. Contesting Paul’s 
justification, one interviewee argued: “Yeah, but he's 
trying to sell a physical thing.” [Interviewee_M4]. 
In IS research, denial of injury is among the most 
popular justifications in various research contexts, such 
as insider crime [79], information security policy 
violations [76], [80] and digital piracy outside the 
workplace [64], [81]. For instance, in a study on digital 
music piracy, denial of injury was found to be the most 
commonly encountered neutralization technique among 
the study participants [81].  
5.4. Denial of the victim 
Our analysis suggests that rationalizations 
reflecting the denial of the victim technique are barely 
acceptable, considering the rich discussions and 
disputes this technique spurred in the interviews. 
According to neutralization theory [24], the denial of the 
victim technique is transformative in that the offender 
transforms the victim into a wrongdoer and the offender 
into a rightful avenger, arguing for example that the 
victim deserved what happened and that “they had it 
coming” [24, p. 669]. The vignette reflected this 
rationalization with Paul blaming his social media 
followers for not doing proper research, for example, 
that “nobody should believe the Internet anyway” and 
that “it's the consumer's fault for being fooled”.  
Most interviewees disputed this rationalizing, and 
implied that such justification is rather unlikely to be 
accepted if their friend Paul used it as an excuse. The 
interviewees generally saw that somebody striving for 
Internet influence, such as Paul, should not downplay 
the effectiveness of that influence as doing so would be 
self-defeating and hypocritical. In other words, one who 
is doing influence professionally, even as part of a 
deceptive campaign, cannot downplay the impact of 
influence!  
This finding was surprising considering that in IS 
research, denial of the victim has been most visible in 
justifying non-organizational violations [64], [77], 
[81]–[83]. For instance, in the context of digital piracy, 
Bhal and Leekha [82] found that denial of victim to be 
a central cognitive logic underlying not considering 
software piracy unethical. On the other hand, most 
workplace IS research has dismissed this technique from 
investigation on the basis of it not being a plausible 
rationalization for violating organizational policy [26], 
[76].  
5.5. Condemnation of the condemners 
The analysis suggests that rationalizations 
attempting to condemn the condemners are extremely 
unacceptable. To Sykes and Matza [24], condemnation 
of the condemners is a deflective technique whereby the 
offender turns the spotlight on those who disapprove of 
the deviant act, arguing for example that those who 
disapprove are “corrupt, stupid, and brutal” [24, p. 668]. 
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Our vignette reflected this rationalization with Paul’s 
attempts to shift the blame from his actions to the flaws 
in “the rules that regulate social media campaigns”, 
“the morals that have you feeling wronged” and “the 
monopolistic practices of social media platforms”.  
Most interviewees dismissed this line of 
argumentation as being unreasonable. For instance, in 
response to Paul’s attack on the rules, an interviewee 
vehemently rejected the justification and noted: “No 
reasonable person is going to say that about 
deception!” [Interviewee_F3].  
Interestingly, despite this finding, in IS research, 
condemning the condemner is often reported as a 
common justification for violating organizational 
policy. This contrast is understandable considering that 
in organizational contexts, employees violate the 
organizational password policy (e.g., writing it down on 
a paper) could reasonably argue that the security 
requirements are complex, frustrating or even annoying 
[26], [73]. However, in the context of crowdturfing, 
there is hardly any maneuver that justifies the 
condemnation of rules that prohibit deception, much 
less morals and how individuals feel about the practice. 
5.6. Appeal to professionalism  
We call this emergent technique ‘appeal to 
professionalism’. Discussions with the interviewees 
pointed our attention to a rationalization rooted in the 
professional outlook of the campaign. After all, this is a 
marketing campaign, organized by a legitimate 
marketing agency and aiming to help a large corporation 
increase its market share. If all these professionals are 
involved, the rationalization goes, then the gig itself 
must be legitimate; “...this is essentially just a business 
thing he [Paul] has done.” [Interviewee_F5] “It was his 
job and he did his job and that was about it.” 
[Interviewee_F2].   
In addition, several interviewees talked about the 
grayness of the situation and legality surrounding it, or 
as Interviewee_M2 puts it: “Legislation always lags 
behind technology.” Thus, appeal to (professional) 
legitimacy seems to be a highly acceptable justification 
for Paul’s participation in the campaign. Our findings 
point to a very surprising revelation: wherein many 
interviewees would categorically reject the abstract 
notion of deception, the same interviewees could accept 
participating in a deceptive social media campaign if it 
was offered to them by a legitimate business in the form 
of a professional job. This became quickly clear from 
the interviews since several participants struggled to see 
any wrongdoing from Paul’s part. At the end of the 
interview session with Interviewee_M11, he concluded: 
“I’m not sure I can form an opinion on how allowed or 
not-allowed this [practice] is yet.” 
All this combined, it can be easily seen why a lay-
user like Paul could be misled into thinking they had 
joined a professional and legitimate advertising 
campaign, only after which they came to realize that 
they were conducting unethical or illegal activities, 
which they now had to justify somehow. “Of course, 
you’re going to make excuses now that you’ve been 
caught with your pants down.” [Interviewee_M12]. One 
interviewee explained it succinctly: “It probably 
dawned on Paul much later that there was something 
shady going on but, in the beginning, probably, he didn't 
know this.” [Interviewee_F6]. 
The interviewees saw that this justification was 
good for Paul’s participation since the authority at hand, 
the professional firm which now pays him salary, had 
deemed the actions and tasks they are giving to Paul as 
acceptable. This compounded by the perception that 
these campaigns are prevalent and legal (or at least gray 
area) can easily lead one to think they can gain 
legitimate working experience from participating in 
such a campaign. “The marketing aspect is important 
for his future job prospects.” [Interviewee_M10] 
What is unique about this technique is that it 
enables an actor to pass on the blame for their unethical 
behavior to a superior (e.g., the hiring agency) who has 
deemed these actions as legitimate, regardless of the 
actor’s own moral assessment of the situation. As such, 
the actor may see their actions as immoral, but since 
they were approved by a legitimate authority, the 
responsibility would eventually lie with the authority 
and not the actor. 
5.7. Appeal to normative fluidity  
We call this technique ‘appeal to normative 
fluidity’ to reflect a novel justification adopted by 
several interviewees alluding to the fact that normative 
rules (e.g., laws, regulations, social norms, etc.) are 
dynamic and ever changing. As such, what is considered 
forbidden (or frowned upon) today could be the new 
norm in the future. Although hiring workers to spread 
false information on social media might not be accepted 
today; we cannot dismiss the possibility that “this is the 
future of advertising.” [Interviewee_M6]. Of all 
possible rationalizations, appeal to normative fluidity 
(e.g., this is the future of advertising) is considered the 
second most plausible. Interviewee_M9, for example, 
considers it “the most realistic” justification.  
This finding points our attention to one of the oldest 
(and often unrecognized) neutralization theory 
assumptions: namely, the flexibility of the normative 
system. Specifically, Sykes and Matza [24] highlighted 
the complexity stemming from the interpretive 
flexibility of the normative system where delinquency 
occurs. This is particularly the case when “the quality of 
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the values is obscured by their context” [84, p. 715]. 
Recognizing this sensitizes us to the conflict that may 
arise from co-existence of formal and informal 
regulative structures, and that in the era of social media, 
novel informal rules might be in the making, and when 
the time is right they would replace today’s norms. 
Benson [85] clarifies this process by pointing the 
reader’s attention to the informal structure. He notes: 
“… an informal structure exists below the articulated 
legal structure, one which frequently supersedes the 
legal structure. The informal structure may define as 
moral and ‘legal’ certain actions that the formal legal 
structure defines as immoral and ‘illegal.’” [p. 593]. The 
flexibility of the normative system makes it plausible to 
accept that the same act may be seen as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, and as ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’ 
depending on the timeframe and context of assessment.  
Could it be that we are experiencing a moral shift 
where what we consider today immoral/unethical will 
become the new norm of the near future? Or are these 
simply the dejected resignations of individuals tired and 
pessimistic about the prospects of social media 
manifesting as opportunistic self-interest? This is 
something for future research to ponder. 
6. Discussion 
Our work has explored the possible justifications of 
cyber deception. The central question guiding this 
endeavor was: what rationalizations could justify 
participating in the crowdsourcing of deception? The 
work presented thus far offers some important 
implications to both theory and practice, as well as 
directions for future research, which we briefly discuss 
next. 
 From a theoretical standpoint, our work 
demonstrates how neutralization theory could help us 
understand a core pre-kinetic [23] cognitive process 
which enables individuals to justify a behavior they 
themselves generally do not approve of. Neutralization 
techniques, however, are not universally applicable to 
all types of deviance. Rather, as Sykes and Matza [24] 
explain, neutralization techniques are learned in 
interaction, and that certain techniques are “better 
adapted to particular deviant acts than to others” [p. 
670]. What this means is that we should not expect 
justification techniques that are suitable to shoplifting 
[72] or car theft [53] to be readily applicable to other 
forms of deviance, such as cyber deception. In this 
regard, our findings provide the first empirical evidence 
in favor of five exceptionally salient techniques. Of the 
classical techniques, the appeal to higher loyalty, denial 
of responsibility, and denial of injury were the most 
dominant ones. In addition, two newly discovered 
techniques emerged from our data: appeal to 
professionalism and appeal to normative fluidity.  
As we suggested earlier, deception may have 
moved on to a new age where the separation between 
the deceiver and their victims increases as more and 
more players are involved in the commercialization of 
deception. For example, in the Samsung-vs-HTC smear 
campaign [1]–[4], a company was hired by Samsung 
which eventually had the deception done by students. 
Most probably, these students, like our study 
participants, believe themselves to have good moral 
judgement and to be generally decent human beings. 
While the interviews were based around deception 
scenarios committed by a fictional character, many 
interviewees in our study agreed, by their own 
admission, that students would be the prime candidate 
for this work, since they would be tempted to take part 
in similar campaigns for marginal amounts of money. 
Effort should be dedicated to making sure this slip does 
not happen. This leads to some practical implications 
which we discuss next. 
Our work has very important practical implications 
in combating cyber deception. The key points we can 
tackle with our findings is to prevent the utilization of 
neutralization techniques by the people participating in 
these campaigns. One of the critical steps to successfully 
combating cyber deviance, such as software piracy, has 
been to understand how software piracy may be justified 
[63], [64], [82]. Such understanding has served as a 
foundation for both policy makers and anti-piracy 
organizations in their development of counterarguments 
and campaigns. With this insight we can place two 
campaigns of similar purpose, one for policy makers and 
one for social media platforms themselves; these being, 
respectively, de-neutralization programs and awareness 
campaigns. 
First, our findings can help devise actionable 
countermeasures against cyber deception through de-
neutralization programs. Being attentive to the 
techniques deployed to justify deceptive crowdwork can 
inform the design of de-neutralization intervention 
programs targeting specific techniques. De-
neutralization campaigns aim to target common 
justifications of digital deviancy, hindering their usage 
to begin with. For example, an anti-neutralization 
campaign targeting the ‘appeal to professionalism’, can 
inform its target audience (e.g., social media users, etc.) 
that the professional outlook and the business glamour 
do not make deception any less insidious; that acts 
(including in cyberspace) should be appraised based on 
their own virtue, not based on how they are packaged 
and sold. These arguments could be put in schools 
together with Internet etiquette and other digital usage 
studies, in order to have the maximum outreach in 
preventing digital deception.  
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Second, awareness campaigns should focus on 
shedding light on the emerging practice of servitizing 
cyber deception (i.e., offering it as a service) under the 
guise of professional crowdwork and gig economy. The 
intent with awareness campaigns is to familiarize users 
with more proper channels for utilizing their social 
media presence, preventing them from slipping into 
cyber deception campaigns, believing this to be 
legitimate Internet advertising practice. In relation to 
this, social media platforms need to make more 
transparent what is allowed and what is not and make 
examples out of these faults. Even if one campaign is 
dealt with internally by a social media platform, to the 
users this action remains largely invisible. 
The crowdsourcing of deception is a largely under-
researched area, which is understandable considering its 
novelty and the challenges associated with its secretive 
operations. These challenges, however, should inspire 
future researchers to adopt (and develop) creative 
research approaches that allow us to gain deeper 
understanding of how and why these operations 
succeed. Our work paves the road to several future 
research directions. Another area of interest for future 
research is exploring the role of the crowdworkers’ 
cultural norms on rationalizing and neutralizing. It is 
also important in the future to consider shedding more 
light on the persuasive role of marketing agencies (i.e., 
the middleperson) in making deception a viable business 
model. Finally, it could also be interesting to shed more 
light on the perspective of the (potential) target-victims 
and how they perceive, consume, and communicate 
disinformation in today’s cyberspace, and what 
mitigation measures they should have in place.  
7. Conclusion 
In this article we explored the techniques by which 
ordinary users might rationalize their participation in 
crowdsourced deception. We set out to study these 
justifications, utilizing neutralization theory as our 
framework and qualitative vignette as our methodology. 
Our findings pointed to five exceptionally convincing 
techniques deeming cyber deception justifiable, namely, 
appeal to higher loyalty, denial of responsibility, and 
denial of injury appeal to professionalism, and appeal to 
normative fluidity. Our work offers groundbreaking 
contributions to both theory and practice. From the 
theoretical standpoint, the work extends neutralization 
theory by demonstrating its applicability in the domain 
of cyber deception. Furthermore, the work extends 
neutralization theory by discovering two techniques 
from the inductive part of the research. Our work 
highlights the practical importance of awareness 
campaigns and de-neutralizing programs in the battle 
against cyber deception. 
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